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CASE COMMENTS
accord with these principles. There may be, however, two additional
reasons for the decision of the California court. One is that courts are,
perhaps, more prone to deny permission to deviate in periods of infla-
tion than in periods of depression. Secondly, the California courts have
been, as a rule, rather strict with reference to permitting deviations
from express terms of trust instruments.23 In their efforts to achieve a
more flexible rule some states have passed statutes which permit a de-
viation from the terms of the trust where such deviation is for the best
interests of the beneficiaries.2 4 The decision in the principal case raises
a doubt as to whether the California courts will exercise their inherent
jurisdiction to permit a deviation from the terms of the trust when a
real emergency does arise.
MERRILL TRADm
RETURN OF BENEFITS AS PREREQUISITE
TO CONTRACT RESCISSION
Rescission implies restoration of both parties to a former status.:
The general rule is that a party who wishes to rescind a contract must
place the defendant in the position he held before the transaction.2
The theory of rescission at law is that an action will not lie until the
other party has been restored to his former position. By returning, or
offering to return, the benefits he has received, the plaintiff acquires
the right to sue for the property he has transferred to the other party.
A court of law in effect rescinds the contract by allowing an action
for recovery of property, chattels or damages, without saying anything
in its judgment concerning the contract. This is a different approach
from that of equity, which avoids the contract and makes the neces-
sary restoration of benefits by decree of the court.3 Flexibility in fram-
nFor illustrative cases see: In re Van Deusen's Estate, 3o Cal. 2d 285, 182 P.2d
565 (1947); Leonardini v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 131 Cal. App. 2d 9,
280 P.2d 81 (1955); Security-First National Bank of Los Angeles v. Easter, 136 Cal.
App. 691, 2!9 P.2d 422 (1934).
"13 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 561 at 495 (1946); 2 Scott, Trusts § 167 at 1177
(2d ed. 1956).
112 Am. Jur., Contracts § 451 (1938).
2 bid., citing an exhaustive list of cases.
These two theories have been described in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Sisson,
19 F.2d 410, 411-12 (W.D. Pa. 1926): "In an action at law the status quo must be
restored before an action will lie. There, in order that the plaintiff may have a
legal remedy based upon rescission by the act of the party himself, he must restore
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ing decrees enables equity courts to adjust their requirements for res-
toration to individual cases, and to give a more adequate remedy
than can be afforded by the law courts.
Two reasons have been advanced for requiring a party rescinding
a contract at law to restore to the other party everything of value that
he has received under it:4 (i) The defendant should not be put to an-
other lawsuit to regain the benefits with which he has parted.5 (2) A
party cannot affirm in part and rescind in part, but must affirm or
rescind in toto.6 The basis for both reasons is the same: it is neither
just nor right to relieve one party from his obligations and to excuse
him from making the other party whole. Equity courts act in accord
with both reasons, decreeing rescission only upon condition that the
benefits received by the rescinding party will be restored.
7
Even at law the general rule requiring restoration of benefits has
exceptions.8 The most important are listed in the Restatement of Con-
tracts,9 which states that restoration is not necessary: (i) When the
thing received is worthless, as in the case of counterfeit money;10 (2)
or attempt to restore the consideration. The rescission reinvested him with the legal
title to the thing for which he subsequently sues, and therefore must be conditioned
upon a surrender of the thing received by him in pursuance of the transaction he
thus avoids. This may be appropriately termed a legal rescission, and is the act
of the party thereto.
"In equity, by reason of the change of situation, a different rule prevails. A
bill in equity is an action brought to rescind, and is not based on any idea, or on
any theory, that the contract has already been rescinded, as in an action at law. Here
the plaintiff sues for rescission. The plaintiff simply seeks the aid of the court to
set aside and rescind the contract, and it is in no sense essential that he should
previously have attempted a rescission, or should have made a tender of the thing
received, to the other party. In such an action the plaintiff simply expresses a will-
ingness to perform such conditions as the court may regard necessary to impose as
proper terms upon which relief shall be granted. In case of rescission, what the
plaintiff should do to reinstate the other party in statu quo as a condition for
rescission is for the court to determine, having fully heard the case. This has been
termed an equitable rescission, and the distinction between it and a legal rescis-
sion is perfectly plain, and has been fully recognized by the authorities."
'Sisson v. Hill, 18 R.I. 212, 26 At. 196, 197 (1893).
51bid.; see Thayer v. Turner, 49 Mass. 55o, 552 (1844); 12 Am. Jur., Contracts
§ 451 (1938).
6"It is a rule that a party cannot rescind a contract and at the same time retain
the consideration, in whole or in part, which he has received under it." Jennings v.
Gage, 13 Ill. 61o, 612 (1852). Accord: Pullman Co. v. Krause, 145 Ala. 395, 40 So.
398, 4oo (19o6); Babcock v. Farwell, 245 Ill. 14, 91 N.E. 683, 692 (191o).
7Garner, Neville & Co. v. Leverett, 32 Ala. 410, 413-14 (1858); Sisson v. Hill, 18
R.I. 212, 26 At. 196, 197 (1893) (dictum).
85 Williston, Contracts § 153o (rev. ed. 1937).
ORestatement, Contracts § 349(2) (1932).
"Kent v. Bornstein, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 342 (1866). Accord: Colil v. Massachus-
etts Security Corp., 247 Mass. 30, 141 N.E. 58o (1923); Restatement, Restitution
§ 65(c) (1936); 5 Williston, Contracts § 1530 (rev. ed. 1937).
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When the thing received has been harmed by the defendant or has
perished because of defects constituting the breach of defendant's con-
tract, as a car stolen because the seller had not furnished a lock as
agreed; 1 (3) When the plaintiff has received only money, which can be
credited to him, as a partially-paid employee seeking the entire value
of his services;12 (4) When the benefit received by the plaintiff is one
for which a price is capable of apportionment and the plaintiff does
not demand return of the total price, as an action to recover a se-
mester's tuition, less reasonable expenses, because the student was
wrongfully expelled after the first few days of school;13 (5) When the
benefit, the value of which can be determined and credited to the
defendant, constitutes a small part of the whole consideration and has
been disposed of without reason to know of defendant's breach, as
selling a small portion of the property purchased before discovery
of the fraud that induced the purchase.
14
Equity also will generally refuse rescission unless restoration can
be accomplished in some manner.15 He who seeks equity must do
equity.16 However, an offer to restore in the complaint is usually held
a sufficient tender.' 7 A statement in the complaint that the complainant
is willing to perform whatever acts the court may decree as a necessary
prerequisite to rescission has been held sufficient.' 8 A failure to offer to
restore has even been excused, because of the power of granting con-
ditional decrees which can compel the rescinding party to restore the
benefits.' 9
uSmith v. Hellman Motor Corp., 122 Misc. 422, 204 N.Y. Supp. 229 (Munic. Ct.
1924).
nPosner v. Seder, 184 Mass. 331, 68 N.E. 335 (19o3). Accord: Vavrica v. Mid-
Continent Co., 143 Neb. 94, 8 N.W.2d 674 (1943), noted in 42 Mich. L. Rev. 189
(1943).
3Aynesworth v. Peacock Military College, 225 S.W. 866 (Tex. Civ. App. 192o).
2'Putnam v. Bolster, 216 Mass. 367, 1o3 N.E. 942 (1914). The Restatement also
lists another exception: when the return of the consideration is impossible from
the time of its receipt; e.g., Ring v. Ring, 127 App. Div. 411, 111 N.Y. Supp. 713
(i9o8), aff'd 199 N.Y. 574, 93 N.E. 113o (191o) (marriage was the consideration, which
it was impossible to return).
McClintock, Equity 231 (2d ed. 1948).
I 2 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence § 393(b) (5th ed. 1941).
17Fuller v. Chenault, 157 Ala. 46, 47 So. 197 (19o8); Perry v. Boyd, 126 Ala. 162,
28 So. 711 (1900); cf. Robison v. Floesch Constr. Co., 291 Mo. 34, 236 S.W. 332, 20
A.L.R. 1239 (1921); 9 Am. Jur., Cancellation of Instruments § 43 (1937)-
IsNew York Life Ins. Co. v. Sisson, 19 F.2d 410 (W.D. Pa. 1926 ). See also Twin
Lakes Land & Water Co. v. Dohner, 242 Fed. 399, 402 (6th Cir. 1917); 5 Williston,
Contracts § 1529 (rev. ed. 1937).
"Carlton v. Hulett, 49 Minn. 308, 51 N.W. 1o53 (1892); Allerton v. Allerton, 50
N.Y. 670 (1872); Restatement, Contracts § 481 (1932).
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In Block v. Block,20 the Supreme Court of Ohio expressed its view-
point on the necessity for a restoration of benefits as a prerequisite to
bringing an action of rescission. A husband had set up an irrevocable
trust, which consisted of assets worth nearly a million dollars, sub-
stantially all of his property. The income was payable to the husband
for life with the remainder over to a charitable foundation. Several
months later the wife filed suit for divorce in an Illinois court. Dur-
ing negotiations for a property settlement a full disclosure of the
husband's assets, including the existence of this trust, was made to the
wife. The property settlement reached, which called for a lump sum
payment of $iio,ooo to the wife, was incorporated into the divorce
decree. Four years after the divorce the husband successfully petitioned
the Common Pleas Court of Ohio to declare the trust void on the
ground that his father had exercised undue influence in securing its
establishment. The court ordered the trustee to reconvey the trust fund
to the husband. Thereupon, the wife filed a bill in equity to have the
property settlement provision of the Illinois divorce decree set aside for
fraud. This was refused. As one of the grounds for this holding the
court quoted a paragraph from the Northeastern Reporter headnote of
an Illinois case: 21
"'The inability of the party to restore the consideration for
a contract which he seeks to rescind will not relieve him from
the necessity of doing so, and it is not sufficient to offer to set off
the amount against what is claimed from the other party.' "22
Immediately following this quotation the Ohio court said:
"We are of the opinion that the plaintiff, not having tend-
ered back the consideration which she received as a result of
the contract and the Illinois decree, cannot maintain this action
to set aside the decree. 23
In so reasoning the Ohio court seemingly followed the general rule
laid down in the law courts, 24 although it was sitting as an equity
court. The court also cited a case involving a cause of action for dam-
ages due to personal injuries,2 5 in which relief against a fraudulently
obtained release was refused because the consideration received was not
20165 Ohio St. 365, 135 N.E.2d 857 (1956).
2 Babcock v. Farwell, 245 III. 14, 91 N.E. 683, 684 (191o) (headnote no. 4).
=165 Ohio St. 365, 135 N.E.2d 857, 864 (1956).
=Ibid.
24McClintock, Equity 231 (2d ed. 1948); 5 Williston, Contracts § 1529 (rev. ed.
1937). The consideration must be returned or tendered before the action at law can
be begun.
2'Picklesmier v. Baltimore & 0. R.R., 151 Ohio St. 1, 85 N.E.2d 214 (1949).
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tendered back before suing. This case clearly involved rescission of a
contract at law.
The primary reason for refusing the wife relief seemed to be the
wife's failure to prove the essential elements of fraud.26 However, the
court used ambiguous language in dismissing the action. It also is un-
certain whether the court was refusing to vacate the Illinois judgment
or refusing to rescind the property settlement contract. It is assumed
that the court refused to modify the court decree because the con-
tract could not be rescinded.27 The contract could not be rescinded
because there was no offer to restore the consideration before the
action was brought.28 This is where the Ohio court, sitting as an
equity court, deviated from the usual equity doctrine.
29
As stated in the Restatement of Contracts,30 there is an exception
to the general rule when the plaintiff receives only money, which
may be credited to him. This exception is recognized by many law
courts. It would certainly seem that an equity court should not re-
quire a stricter rule of restoration than is required at law. The res-
toration could have been provided for by a conditional decree, if the
rescission was warranted. The denial of relief, because there was no
tender of the benefit received, seems at best a makeweight argument
and not in consonance with the better reasoned equitable doctrines.
The rule of restoration by one seeking to rescind a contract should
be reasonably interpreted, especially in equity, where flexible decrees
may be used to protect both parties. It is submitted that the court in
the principal case has confused the requirements of restoration as
they exist at law and in equity. The end result of the court's reasoning
is that an equity court has overlooked the advantages inherent in its
own existence.
CiniARs C. RODRIGUEZ
'165 Ohio St. 365, 35 N.E.2d at 865.
l165 Ohio St. 365, 15 N.E.2d at 863, where the court says: "It is clear from
the record in the instant case that the divorce decree may not be modified or set
aside and the award increased without a rescission of the contract of settlement."
2See note 23 supra.
See note 3 supra.
wSee § 349(2)(c) (1932).
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